THE

KINGDOM

OF

SWEDEN

Restored to its

True Interest.

A

POLITICAL DISCOURSE.

LONDON,
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MDCLXXXII.



To the

READER.

without almost any distinction, takes upon him to speak of, and to decide in matters of State. And as it is not every Prince's fortune to know how to distinguish an honest man from a base and mercenary one; a man of business and fit for it, from a pedant, or such a one that is merely able to relate things as he is told them; it is no wonder if the Councils of Princes are not always furnish'd with Persons of that capacity and desert, as is required: and if in consequence hereof, it happens that from time to time they commit very great errours, that draw upon them considerable losses, and disappointments, whereby the Publick cannot but suffer extremely.

The Kingdom of Sweden hath had a sad tryal hereof, and nothing but the wisedom of its King hath recovered it. And as this Recovery cannot but be highly beneficial to the Publick, which might

To the Reader.

might be looked upon as being in a very good posture, if some Councils, that seem to halt, could be set aright: so it is that, which gave occasion to the birth and publishing of this small Treatise. Which if it doth not displease the Reader, may be solvowed in sew days by another, done by the same hand, intituled, In what manner the Losses of Strasburg and Casal ought to be considered. In the mean while farewell.

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Restored to its true Interest.

T's no common Vertue to know how to walk by the rules of true Interest. For this is really all, the most perfect Wisedom can teach a Sovereign Prince. But to the end a Prince may not mistake himfelf, in the direction of matters of this Importance, it is absolutely necessary that he himself do understand wherein really confifts his true Interest, not in part onely, but in the whole. For that is the most sure, or at least, if he be not endowed with all the qualities hereto required, that he be capable, to chuse a wise and faithfull Council. For without either of these two, a Prince must be extremely fortunate, if he doth not become a prey to his Ministers, that will often facrifice him to their Passions and particular Interests. Whereof the Histories of all Ages do afford us thousands of Examples, and that wherein we live is too well stored with 'em, to the great prejudice of the Publick. But God be thanked that the Kingdom of Swedland, fertile in Princes of great capacity and vertue, doth in our days see its Sceptre in the hands of a Monarch, that doth not only preserve his Subjects and faithfull Allies, from such apprehensions, but also affords in his Royal Person, a persect model of a truly wise, imagnanimous and pious Prince; wife, pious and magnanimous in that valiant way of the great Gustave, and Charles Gultave

Gustave his glorious Ancestours. Which is so true, that whoever will consider without prejudice the first steps and conduct of the King of Sweden, immediately after he began to enjoy fully his Royal right of Majority, will be oblig'd to acknowledge, that in his sacred Person seems to be revived that greatness of mind and sublime Genius of these two Heroes; and these first steps I think I may well comprehend under these five Heads.

First, The unshaken Constancy, this young Monarch hath shewn, when under the most unsertunate circumstances, the direction of his Assairs in his Minority had

brought him under, during all the last War.

Secondly, His heroick Courage when at the head of his Armies, as foon as it was in his power, to dispose of his facred Person, which this Prince hath exposed to all dangers and hazards, as much as the meanest of his

Subjects could have done.

Thirdly, His Wisedom and extraordinary Prudence in the management of his Assairs, till the conclusion of his particular Peaces, in regard to his suspicious, but dangerous and puissant Ally and Consederate; which had engaged him in his *Minority*, to make such steps, as have caused all his Losses, and the total ruine of his Estates and Subjects, for a longer time than were to be wished.

Fourthly, In the order and admirable economy, this Prince hath been able, immediately after the figning of his particular Peaces, to establish in all his Dominions, for the managing of his *Finances*, and for the banishing from them for ever, all Consusion and Corruption.

Fifthly, That notwithstanding the deplorable condition of the publick Affairs of Christendom in general, this Monarch hath, out of his own Motive, most wife-

ly and most generously declared himself, for the only Party meet for his Piety, Glory, and for his most ef-

sential Interest.

I am fure what I have advanced in the four first Articles, can be denyed by no Man, fince it is known to all Europe, that I have said nothing but what is real and true. But because in regard of the fifth, France begins to mutter, and the French Ministers do loudly and very unequitably censure the judicious Conduct of his Majesty of Swedland, in this particular; I have thought that after the obliging carriage of this Monarch, in reference to the Publick, it could not be but very ferviceable, to let all unbiass'd Persons in authority know, the Justice and Wisedom thereof. Which by God's affistance I hope to doe easily in few words. and yet perspicuously and evincingly; for Truth doth naturally explain and support it self. And to begin, I think it rational to fay, that the French Ministers cannot lawfully pretend his Majesty could in this Matter. as well as in all others, behave himself otherwise, than according to his Degrees, Dignities and natural Characters, and according to his Principles of Piety, Interest and Glory, inseparable from the first.

In regard of the Degrees and Dignities inseparable from the Person of this Monarch, we may well say, that whether he be considered by himself or in reference to others, he must be looked upon in the first place as hereditary King of Swedland, and of all the Dominions united and annexed thereunto (which cannot be judged to be dependant from the Empire) either by Conquest or by Treaties, the Kings his Predecessours have formerly made with the Moscovites, Poland and the

Kings of Denmark.

Secondly.

Secondly, As Duke of Bremen and Pomeren, and Prince of Ferden and Lord of Wismar, with all that hath been added to these Dukedoms and Principalities, and authentically surrendred to his Majesty, by the Peace of Westphalia, only excepted what his Majesty hath been obliged to lose thereof, by the last Treaties of Nimequen.

Thirdly, As Duke of *Deux Ponts* by an unquestionable right of succession already acquired, and to be acquired for the future to his Person, as well as to his Successiours, whenever it happeneth, to all the Dominions and Dignities, of what nature soever, of the House

Palatine and of Bavaria.

Fourthly, In case of a manifest oppression as defender of the Protestant Religion, upon the continent of the North, and more particularly in the Empire. cannot be consider'd as an empty and chimerical Title: fince it is upon this onely ground, the States general of the Kingdom of Swedland did establish that of the power of dethroning Sigismond, hereditary King of Swedland, and Elective of Poland; and of depriving him of all his right, to the Royal Dignity and Crown of Swedland, and of transferring the same as they did, upon Charles, Duke of Sudermanland, Father to the great Gustave, whom they caused to ascend immediately the Throne. And it was also by virtue of the same right, the great Gustave entred most heroically into the Empire, and for to preserve and transmit the same as an unquestionable title to the Kings his Succesfours, did there not onely expose himself, to all hardships and dangers, but to his eternal Glory, sacrific'd at last his own Life.

And as in all that is abovefaid I think, I have delivered ruth; and the Degrees and Dignities of his Majesty of Swedland being thus sully cleared and fixed, I conceive it will not be difficult, to define the nature of the Interest and Maximes inseparable from them, in relation to the matter I am now speaking of. And that I may doe it with the more exactness, I shall divide them in four Articles, in pursuance of the Method I have already prescribed unto my self, by defining his Degrees, Rights and Dignities.

Article I.

His Majesty of Swedland as hereditary King of that Kingdom, with the Imperial Right, which Protestant Kings onely have the advantage to enjoy without any exception, has the natural Interest, all Sovereign Princes generally have, to be carefully upon his guards, that no Prince or Potentate upon what pretense or occasion soever, be suffered to put himself in a posture, to be able to disquiet him in any part of the whole extent of his Monarchy. And therefore it cannot be controverted, that it is his Duty, nay, his indispensable Duty, to hinder as much as in him lieth, by all just and lawfull ways, that no Power in Europe, do raise and establish it self above a certain degree by Sea or by Land.

Article II.

His Majesty of Swedland, as Duke of Bremen and Pomeren, and as Prince of Ferden, and Lord of Wismar, being all Provinces situated in the Empire, is precisely concerned, not onely to take care of the particular conservation of these his Dominions; but also

of, or without the *Empire*, be deficient in bearing due respect to a Body, whereof his Majesty acknowledgeth himself to be a Member, and on certain Occasions a Protector. The second, that no Settlement ever be made in the *Empire*, whose Maximes may any way directly or indirectly or by consequence, be in the least contrary to the means, whereby and upon which the Right and Title of the King and Crown of *Swedland* and Propriety of the Dukedoms and Principalities aforesaid hath been established in the *Empire*.

Article III.

His Majesty of Swedland, as Count Palatine or Duke of Deux Ponts, by unquestionable right of an acquired Succession, cannot but be esteemed to have a great Interest, as well of glory as otherwise, to see, that no Prince may hinder him from the enjoyment of his right of Succession. And this with so much more reason, as the free and quiet possession of this Dukedom, must infallibly be a president to the right of unquestionable succession, that may for the future fall to his Majesty aforesaid, or to any of his Royal Successours, of all the Dignities and Dominions belonging to the House Palatine, and to that of Bavaria, if ever the Throne or the Branches of this House (which for that reason hath the right of primogeniture over his Majesty of Swedland and his Line) should want Heirs Male, which is, or may in time be of too great Importance, to be flighted or neglected. And what I have faid just now, as to be observed by the bye, doth not onely regard the King of Swedland, but also all the the Princes and States of the Empire. For if so great a King as his Majesty of Swedland may, under some pretense or other, be deprived of an unquestionable right of succession, what Prince, Earl, Baron, or ancient Nobleman can promise himself the enjoyment of his right of a lawfull Succession; or rather, who must not from this very hour despair thereof and renounce thereunto.

Article IV.

The King of Swedland, as defender of the Protestant Religion in the Empire (which Title is a Jewel the great Gustave has purchased and annexed to his Crown, too dear for to be neglected) is most effectually concerned, to look upon any Prince whatsoever, as his capital Enemy, that contrary to the Peace of Westphalia, endeavours to oppress the whole Protestant Party, or part thereof in the Empire, and consequently to sacrifice all the vigour and strength Almighty God hath endowed him withal, for to obtain satisfaction of him.

But things having been pretty quiet in the Empire, as for this particular, ever fince the aforesaid Peace, and being like to continue so for the suture, if no stronger did intermeddle therewith: this onely regards, at least hitherto, the Proceedings, a Foreign Power hath some sew years since carried on, contrary to all Divine and Humane Laws, under a specious pretense of Zeal to the Roman Catholick Religion, to oppress some Members of the Protestant Party in the Empire.

But as it is notorious, that this same Foreign Power hath made nothing of invading several important

Places

Places in the Spanish Netherlands, with the Dukedoms of Lorrain and Bar, notwithstanding they are most Catholick Countreys; and that not long since, the same Power had a stomach strong enough to swallow and digest at once Strasburg and Casal, without regard to their Religion; and that consequently all Catholick States and Princes of the Empire may upon very good grounds guess, what they must promise themselves: it is to be believed, that the King of Swedland, in case his Majesty were at last forc'd to undertake some thing, by way of Arms, against this Foreign Power, will, without question, be assisted by all, as the conservation of the publick Rights and Privileges of the Empire doth require, for the common good of all its Members, confifting chiefly in the due observation of the Agreements made by the Peace of Westphalia, without any innovation. But before we go any further, two things ought to be carefully obferved.

The first is; That the sour sorts of Establishments and Interests we have spoken of, are really the sour Wheels whereupon the Royal Chariot of Swedland, ought to move, or the sour Pillars, whereby the glory of that Crown is to be upheld and supported. And his Majesty of Swedland that now is, cannot depart from, or sorsake any of these sour Fundamentals, without shaking the whole building, and without plunging himself anew, but more desperately than heretotore, in the same Abyss of Losses, Consuston and Disorder, his Majesty hath been forced to essay during the whole course of these last Wars: and for this only reason, as it is very necessary to observe, because his Council, complying then too much with the Passions of that

of France, had utterly forsaken these essential Maxims which slow naturally from these four Dignities, Degrees and Fundamentals, and do ingage his Majesty of Swedland to look upon perpetually as the compass, whereby the Vessel of his grandeur being conducted, will always arrive at the desired Haven, by the assistance of Almighty God, maugre the Rage of all sorts

of Tempests and Enemies.

The fecond is; That as on the one fide we have laid open without any difguise, the true Interest of his Majesty of Swedland, as also the Maxims, that are natural consequences thereof: so on the other side it is very well known, that the French Ministers have fome years fince given fo manifestly to understand, by the whole conduct of their Affairs, wherein the Interest of their Monarch doth essentially consist, that his Majesty of Swedland and his Council must needs be destitute of common Sense, if they have not discovered, that in case his Majesty had continued his Alliance with France, and confequently made some new diversion in favour of that Crown, according to the necessities of the same, that Crown, to speak plain, would without question have compass'd these three principal Ends.

The first, His most Christian Majesty would thereby have been able to conquer easily the rest of the Spanish Netherlands, either by way of dependency, or some suddain invasion, and immediately after to subdue intallibly the united Provinces, whilst the French soment and entertain the Divisions in England. So that by uniting the Maritime Forces of that Republick, which by this conjunction could not but become very formidable, France might go and admini-

iter.

ster, according to his own mind and pleasure, even in the Sound, and on all the navigable Seas of the North; in the same manner, that Crown hath been daring enough not long ago, to undertake, with its own Sea-forces against the Turk in the Archipelago.

Secondly, That by the means of these two Conquests, and of all his Land and Sea Forces, his most Christian Majesty would have been capable to penetrate so far into the Empire, as to be able, not onely to preserve to himself, by an unalterable title, the Dukedom of Deux Ponts, already in a manner usurped by that Monarch from his Majesty of Swedland, but also by a precedent concerning this part of Succession, render illusory all others, that may for the suture sall to his Majesty of Swedland's share, or to the Kings his Successours, in Right of the House Palatine and of Bavaria.

Thirdly, As a Conquerour never wants a Pretence, that his most Christian Majesty being effectually able to execute all he lists in the *Empire*, would without doubt, under the specious pretence of *Catholicism*, and restitution of *Church Land*, have put himself in that, of usurping and destroying not onely the whole *Empire*, Catholicks as well as Protestants; but also in particular to despoyle his Majesty of *Swedland* of his Dukedoms of *Bremen* and Principality of *Ferden*, and of all that Prince doth possess of any value in *Pomeren* and *Meklenburg*, granted to him by the Peace of *Westphalia*.

I speak plain, and am assured I have asserted nothing, but what is agreeable to the rules of Right, and what any Man of understanding cannot but be very sensible of, if he take the pains to examine things according to the nature thereof, and in reference to what may be ex-

pected

pected from them for the future, in the like case; and it is easy to judge from these Reslexions, of the connexion of the Interest of Swedland, with that of France, in

general or particular, at least for the present.

But since the French Ministers suppose with a brazen Face, that nothing doth more sympathetically agree, than the present Interest of Swedland with that of France, to take away all occasion of complaint, as if they were condemned unheard; let us examine the Arguments, these Ministers make use of, to perswade themselves, or endeavour to perswade others into so Ill-grounded, or rather Chimerical an Opinion.

The aforefaid Arguments, as these Ministers them-

selves do confess, are but two in number.

The first whereof is grounded upon the ancient Alliance made by the great Gustave with France, and upon the mutual understanding wherein these two Crowns did act in the Empire, till the Peace of Westphalia; France pretending and supposing this onely Example to be sufficient, to hinder the King of Swediand, to sollow or establish any other, that may alter a Relation

fo usefull and glorious to Swedland.

The second is sounded upon the stedsastness, his most Christian Majesty hath shewn at the congress at Nimeguen, till the making of the separate Peaces of Swedland; that Monarch not being to be perswaded to consent to any Peace, till the restitution of what had been conquered from Swedland was agreed upon. France supposing that by so generous a proceeding his Majesty of Swedland is become precisely obliged, never to enter into any Alliance, but with concert and participation of France.

These Arguments indeed are very specious, and C 2 may

may be able to make impressions upon those, who do consider onely the outward shape of things. But I am fure, whoever dives into the bottom of them, will find them very shallow and weak: and to make the nullity thereof the more evidently conspicuous, there needs nothing as for the first, but to consider, that although the great Gustave did not come into the Empire, till he had made a fecret Alliance with Lewis the XIII. French King; yet the nature thereof ought to be well considered. For Gustave coming into the Empire but as a Foreign Prince, and with a defign to maintain and defend the Liberty of Germany, and of the Protestant Religion, in conjunction with, and upon the pressing defires of the Protestant Party in the Empire, that thought it self oppressed, and Lewis XIII. having declared himself to be almost for the same Protection; there was nothing at that juncture of time, that could have hindred the great Gustave to make an Alliance with France. But Lewis the XIV. having notoriously undertaken nothing in the Empire, either during the whole course of the last War, or fince the last Treaties of Peace, but to oppress there the Liberties of Germany, and of the Protestant Religion; this doth so total--ly alter the nature of the business, that it is very rational to fay, that if the French King doth continue his Proceedings, his Majesty of Swedland, whether as a considerable Member of the Empire, or as defender of the Protestant Religion in the said Empire, can doe no less, than from an Ally become an Enemy of the most Christian King. And as heretofore the great Gustave made Alliances with France, for the support of his Interest; so must not now the French Ministers doubt, that if they go on in their continual Incrochments upon the Empire, and its Allies; or if they do not restore all they have usurped since the Peace of Nimeguen, by sorce or fraud, his Majesty of Swedland will think himself under an indispensable obligation, to make Allian ces with all those Princes and States, that will concur with him, in opposing the progress of his most Christian Majesty, and in obliging the same, to observe the Treaties of Peace of Westphalia and Nimeguen.

Moreover the French Ministers ought not to make fo much noise about an Alliance, in the performance whereof Lewis the XIII. failed immediately after the fame was contracted, by making a new one with the Elector of Bavaria, and his Contederates, and for no other end, as has been well known, than to obstruct the proceedings of Gustave; which did put him to very great straits, drawing upon him a multitude of Troubles and Inconveniencies, which at last by the subtle contrivance of Cardinal de Richelieu, and the Intrigues this Prelate carried on in that Princes own Army, did in conclusion cost him his Life, at the very nick of time, when this generous Monarch was going to triumph, in a most advantageous manner, over all his Enemies. And for this reason it is the French Ministers ought discreetly to have been filent in this matter, fince without doubt his Majesty of Swedland is very well informed, of the fecret Intrigues, whereby France got Brisac, and the right of prefecture of Alfatia, and became the chief Obstacle Swedland met withall in every step, at the negotiating the Peace of Westphalia; whereby the Crown of Swedland was hindred from preserving to it self far greater advantages in the Empire, than those the same Crown got by the aforefaid Peace.

And as for the second, the French Ministers must really have a mind to be merry with, or harbour an extraordinary small opinion of other Mens Understandings, when they mean to put this to account. For how would his most Christian Majesty have been able to support that point of glory, whereof that Prince pretends to be so jealous, if he had consented to the Peaces with the King of Denmark, the Elector of Brandenburg, the Duke of Zell and the Bishop of Munster, without stipulating and executing the restitution of the Conquests these four Princes had made upon his Majefly of Swedland, or without any other regard, but to his sole politick Interest? how could his most Christian Majesty without stipulating and executing such a restitution, hope or pretend, that any Prince or Sovereign State would ever care for an Alliance with him, or make any diversion in his favour? This Monarch is too tender upon the point of his Reputation, which he knows to be of valt confequence on the like occafions, and is too great a Master in the knowledge of his politick Interest, for to commit so gross an Errour, at least for the outward shew; and the less for this reason, because he could not but know, that all Europe was sensible of two things, that could not be brought into question.

The first, That although the abovesaid sour Princes had made these considerable conquests upon the King of Swedland, yet his Majesty had lost them for no other reason, but for having made a diversion in favour of France, so important to the most Christian King, against one of these four Princes in the Year 1674. at a time, when by the conjunction of the Forces of the Elector of Brandenburg to those of the Emperour and

the other Allies, his most Christian Majesty was very near losing Brisac, which would of necessity have caused the restitution of the Dukedoms of Lorrain and Bar to their lawfull Prince, nothing being then able to hinder it.

The fecond, That his most Christian Majesty was the more oblig'd to make this step in favour of the King of Swedland, because it is certain, that by the means of this important diversion in favour of France his most Christian Majesty was afterwards in a capacity, in the first place to doe what he pleased, during the whole course of the War. Secondly, when it came to the making of the Peace, his most Christian Maje-My hath in a manner totally prescribed it, according to his own will and pleasure; for all the consequences of this fatal diversion, have been occasioned because the Forces of Denmark, Brandenburg, Zell and Munfter being employed in the North, and thereby hindred from marching to the Fronteirs of France, as else they might have done, and as it was absolutely necesfary they should have done; it was because of the abfence of these Forces, whereupon the Consederates had reckoned, that the French King hath been able to make as many Conquests, as his Majesty hath undertaken Seiges; and that he hath defisted from nothing, but what he has been pleased. And to prove fully, that in all probability things would not have fallen out thus, if the Northern Forces had been at liberty, to transport themselves jointly with the rest of the Consederates towards the Fronteirs of France, the fuccess of the Battel at Treves, and the last Combate and raising of the Blockade of Mons having been sufficient to evince, that the French Generals, and French Armies are not invincible, : a token that the French Ministers have been themselves sensible hereof, and that these Northern Forces did puzzed them a little, that as soon as they had reason to apprehend that the greatest part thereof was ready to march, in order to act jointly with the rest of the Consederate Forces towards the Fronteirs of France, may very well serve the precipitation, wherewith the aforestial Ministers did sign the particular Peace with the Republick of the united Provinces, and presently after with Spain, the Emperour and Empire; and all this when France was in a posture to undertake all, if the dread of the Northern Forces, whereof they did sear the approach, had not put a stop to all its undertakings.

And to be fully convinced, that the French Ministers did not surfease the course of their Conquests, but out of this onely regard, and not out of any Principle of Moderation, or a hearty desire of Peace, we need but observe, what they have done by the means of their Intrigues and violence against the Empire and the Spanish Netherlands, since this fear hath been dissipated,

notwithstanding all the Treaties of Peace.

This being thus proved, I think no body can doubt of the truth of these two sollowing things. The first is, the vanity or rather the nullity of the two abovementioned Reasons, alledged by France. The second, that his most Christian Majesty, as well by the principles of his true Interest, as for some other respects which no Prince can neglect, without wronging himself extremely, was indispensably obliged, to insist upon the intire and essectional restitution of all the Dominions and Countries, these sources had conquered from his Majesty

Majesty of Swedland, who without doubt might expect it according to all the rules of Right and Justice. But it is to be known for once, that it is very far from thence; there being a great deal of difference in the performance of a duty, betwixt doing it onely in part, and with offensive restrictions, or to doe it generously, without any limitation at all. And I think my felt the more obliged to make known to the World, the captiousness of these proceedings, the more the noise the French Ministers make about this affair does ingage me thereunto: and because it is convenient that all Princes of Europe should know, how dangerous it is to make any engagements or alliances with fo crafty and selfish Ministers, as the French really are. moreover very usefull, to let those Ministers know at last, that these Northern Nations, which they usually look upon as Strangers and Barbarians, do not want People, that are fometimes able, to penetrate into their most fecret and most hidden Intrigues and Managements, and to discover the malignity and principles thereof.

And the better to support what I have said, we need but remember, What I have delivered heretofore, concerning the Character of defender of the Protestant Religion in the Empire, inseparable from the Kings and

Crown of Swedland.

Secondly, That at the making of the Peace of West-phalia, the Swedish Ministers in conjunction with the Protestant Princes and States, in order to preserve perpetually this right to the Kings and Crown of Swedland, so as to put them in an infallible capacity to exercise the same, whenever there should be an occasion, did, with the unanimous consent and acquiescing of the

the whole Empire, as well of the Head as the Mem-

bers thereof, establish - three things.

First, That to the Kings and Crown of Swedland were delivered and entirely yielded, as we have said already, the Dukedoms of Bremen, of Pomeren, the Principality of Ferden and Seigniory of Wismar and several other Dominions, to put the Kings of Swedland into a capacity, to entertain in the Empire Troops, sufficient for to support that Dignity if need required; and in case these Troops were not sufficient, to be able to reinforce them by Sea with those of Swedland it self, by the way of Wismar, Stralsund and Stettin.

Secondly, That with that part of Pomeren, which hath been given to the Crown of Swedland, there was also granted to the same, a piece of Land along the River Oder, whereby his Majesty of Swedland was enabled, on the Side of Stettin, onely by crossing this River, to march up into the Continent, there to relieve and protect the Protestant Party, if ever it came to be

oppress'd.

Thirdly, That to enable the Kings of Swedland, to support and relieve the same Party, there hath also been yielded to that Crown, besides the Dukedom of Bremen and Principality of Ferden, the Bailiwicks of Teting-hausen and Wildhausen, at the other side of the River Weser, which afforded a sure passage to the Forces of his Majesty of Swedland, which could by these means be on all occasions transported, from the Dukedom of Bremen and Principality of Ferden, into the heart of Westphalia, and from thence wheresoever it would have been necessary.

This was without question very judiciously contrived, and executed, so that the Empire having granted

all these Concessions to the Crown of Swedland, did enjoy the same very peaceably, till the last War, and would in all probability have enjoyed the fame still, if by the instigation of France, that Crown had not unfortunately began the War in the North, against the Elector of Brandenburg. But his Majesty of Swedland being, by the ill success thereof, forced to consent, to all what his most Christian Majesty was pleased to ordain herein; the Dukedom of Bremen and Pomeren with the Principality of Ferden and Seigniory of Wismar, have indeed been restored to his Majesty of Swedland; but for what concerns that tract of Land, at the other fide of the Oder, his Majesty of Swedland hath been oblig'd to yield it to the Elector of Brandenburg; and for what concerns the Bailiwicks of Tetinghausen and Wildhausen, his Majesty aforesaid hath been obliged to surrender them to the Duke of Zell, and to the Bishop of Munster, who have shared them betwixt them; that is to fay, the Body of these Provinces in the Empire have really been restored to his Majesty, the glory and interest of his most Christian Majesty requiring the same absolutely; but onely after they were maliciously deprived of both their Armes, whereby the Kings of Swedland were enabled to succour and relieve the Protestant Party in the Empire, and to preserve by that means the usefull Character of defender thereof. By which Agreement (at least if there be not established a new Agreement amongst the Protestant Princes of the North, which is really very necessary) if at present the Prote stant Party comes to be oppressed in the Empire, his Majesty of Swedland would not be able to succour them by the way of the River Oder, without drawing upon 'himself the Forces of his Electoral Highness of Branden

burg; nor by the way of the Weser, than by drawing upon him the Forces of the House of Lunenburg, and of

the Bishop of Munster.

By the ingenuous deduction of this particular matter, it is easy to judge what any Prince or State may lawfully expect, if for having been an Ally of France, things come ever to that pass, that the French Ministers, after having triumphed over their Enemies, become absolute masters of the Peace, as they have been at Nimeguen. For it is unreasonable to believe, that the aforefaid Ministers did fail in this, by inadvertency, or because they were not able to make these Princes acquiesce to the full restitution of their Conquests; for they know too much, for to commit such a sin out of ignorance; and the Arms of France were then too formidable, not to be able, to oblige these Princes to the total restitution of their Conquests, as they have effectually obliged the King of Denmark. And it is no way to be doubted, that this hath been thus directed, by a Council, wherein the Fesuits, irreconcileable Enemies of the Protestant Party, and of the Crown of Swedland, did preside for three principal Ends.

The first, That if ever any occasion to oppress the Protestant Party in the Empire, should happen, France might be able to doe it, without any sear of controul or

hinderance therein from Swedland,

The second, That the aforesaid Party losing thereby all this fort of hopes, might by little and little lose the respect and consideration, which the same hath hitherto inviolably preserved for the Kings and Crown of Swedland.

The third, That if ever it happened that a King of Swedland should undertake by any of these two ways, to succour

and consequently a war betwixt the Protestant Princes of the North, whereby it would become easie to bring the Protestant Party to extremities in the middle of the

Empire.

I am sure that if my Reader be just, he cannot without indignation think on these extraordinary Proceedings, so little agreeing with that honour and candour that ought always to be inviolable amongst true and saithfull Allies, that are of the same dignity. And yet I must inform him, that to make throughly evident what hard usage his Majesty of Swedland hath met withall from the French Ministers, I must take notice of some-

thing very confiderable and worth observing.

It is known to all Europe, that his Majesty of Swedland, to satisfy all the Articles of his Alliances with France, made in the Year 1674. a very important diversion, whereof we have spoken already: and that thereby his Majesty aforesaid did draw upon him at once the Forces of Denmark, the Elector of Brandenburg, of the Duke of Zell and of the Bishop of Munster, and part of those of his Imperial Majesty; and that to defend himself against so formidable Forces, his Majesty was necessitated to be in person at the head of one of his Armies, and to expose himself as we have said already, to all sorts of hazards and dangers.

Secondly, That in consequence of this diversion, and the extraordinary efforts his Majesty of Swedland made for to go on therewith, for the reasons we have mentioned already, his most Christian Majesty was effectually inabled to triumph over all his Enemies, as it did ap-

pear but too much.

And this not being to be contradicted, it is reasonable

ble to say, that at least in this juncture of time, his most Christian Majesty could not but shew, whensoever any occasion offered it self, some gratitude, and acknow-

ledgment to his Majesty of Swedland.

And as at this juncture of time, there was a very great occasion, wherein his most Christian Majesty might have shewn part of his gratitude to his Majesty of Swedland, it would not be amiss to examine how the French

Ministers did behave themselves therein.

This occasion happened at the succession of the Palatinate or Dukedom of Deux Ponts, being a Patrimony, the French Ministers could not but know, did directly regard his Majesty of Swedland, since the same was in a short time to fall to his Majesty's share, as well because the deceased Duke had no Heirs Male, that might have succeeded him, as because he was of an Age decrepit.

This consideration did not suffer his Majesty of Swedland to doubt, but that on so fit an opportunity, his most Christian Majesty would be very glad, to give him some marks of his friendship and gratitude, the more because his Ambassadour at the French Court, had represented something of that nature, and because the deceased Duke did not at all meddle with any business, and preserved constantly a very great respect for his most Christian Majesty.

But what did happen? That which really all Afterages will hardly be able to believe; that is to fay, at the very nick of time, when his most Christian Majesty was indebted, to speak plain, for all, to the King of Swedland; the greatest part of that Dukedom was most horribly ransack'd, pillaged and burnt, by the Orders and Armies of France; and after the old Duke was most unworthily driven out of his Palace, which without

contra-

contradiction was one of the most beautifull and most stately Buildings in the whole Empire, the same Forces have totally destroy'd, burnt, and demolish'd it, which hath onely been a prelude, as a fatal experience hath shewn it, of what was to follow, by the violence from the fame hands, against the whole Dukedom, immediately after the fuccession thereof was fallen to the King of Swedland by the death of the deceased Duke. For, contrary to all divine and humane Laws, as if there were but a little pittifull Country Gentleman in the case, the whole Dukedom hath been seased by order of his most Christian Majesty, and afterwards in a manner exposed to sale, by inch of Candle, to be delivered to the most bidding, and that would be in a humour to doe fealty and homage thereof to the Crown of France; as if his most Christian Majesty had any suanner of right, or title to an ancient Patrimony of the Houses Palatine and of the Empire.

And these are such proceedings, whereby not onely his Majesty of Swedland without sear of committing an errour, hath been inabled to learn perfectly, what may really be expected from the alliance and gratitude of the French Ministers; but also all other Monarchs, Princes and Sovereign States, whom France now courts for their alliance, may from thence clearly and perfectly understand, how far at last the savours, graces and gratitude, they must expect from that Crown, may extend them

felves.

And methinks I have said enough already, for to obtain leave of my Reader to say no more, in justification of the Prudence and Justice of his Majesty of Swedland, relating to his last Carriages. But, for the publick good, I am going to unravel the whole Mystery and Cunning

of the Designs of the French Ministers, and by the same means, to lay open what at last all Europe may expect, if the same Ministers succeed in their dangerous Projects: to the end, that every one in particular as well as in gegeral, may act with that concert, as his own prudence

and strength may inable him to doe.

His Majesty having signed the Alliance whereof we are speaking, and the news thereof being on a Morning come to the French Court, it was said there, with one voice, that the King of Swedland had declared war against France; which was reslected on and blamed, as the most unworthy and most unwarrantable proceeding, I forbear out of certain respects, to mention all that was said, to brand the Resolution of his Majesty of Swedland on this occasion.

I affert nothing, but what many credible Letters have informed; and yet as the faid Alliance containeth nothing, but what is very innocent and just, so no man could perswade himself, that the same could be so much disliked. But this Point was cleared soon after, when Count D'Avaux, the French Ambassadour at the Hague, by a Memorial which he delivered some sew days after, from the King his Master to the States General of the united Provinces; and whereof I could be silent, if that Minister had not taken care to render it publick, declared in plain terms concerning this Alliance, that the King his Master could not look upon those as his Friends that were always ready, to sign such Alliances; since it could not be doubted, that they are directly contrary to his most essential Interest.

This Minister certainly could not speak more plain; and because an unfortunate News monger had publish't, that the said Ambassadour was very well pleased with

the Alliance aforesaid, Monsteur D'Avaux delivered a second Memorial whereby he demanded justice against the same, and hath confirmed in stronger terms than those he used in his first Memorial, that he had said nothing, but by the express Order and Command of the King his Master; and as there remaineth no more any doubt concerning the same, so to the end we may dive into the bottom of the consequences of such Declarations, we must first consider two Particulars.

The first, The nature of the Alliance, the King of Swedland hath signed; the second, with whom.

As to the first, This Alliance containeth nothing, but a mutual promise betwixt the two Parties ingaged, to use reciprocally all their endeavours, and to imploy their utmost for the conservation of the Peace of Westphalia and Nimeauen

and Nimeguen.

For the second, His Majesty of Swedland hath signed this Alliance with the Republick of the united Provinces; that is to say, with a State which of all the free States and Sovereigns of Europe is most absolutely inclined to peace; and preserves the greatest respect for his most Christian Majesty.

And yet for all this, a most strange thing! France declares with a loud voice, and by the publick Writings of its Ministers, that it is to declare war against them, and that the French Monarch cannot take for his friends, those that are always ready to sign such Alliances, because it cannot be unknown that they are directly contrary to

his most essential Interest.

In good truth, I find nothing so fit as this, for to doe three things at once. First, to justify thoroughly the Prudence and Wisedom of the King of Swedland. Secondly, to prove his Zeal and sincere Affection for the conservation of the publick Interest and Security. And

thirdly, to open the Eyes of all Potentates, Princes and Sovereign States of Christendom.

The first Point.

The Wisedom of the King of Swedland doth appear in the first place herein, that his Majesty, notwithstanding the French Minister at his Court hath not omitted any thing, to perswade his Majesty into a belief that the King his Master hath no other Intention, than to observe most religiously the Treaties of Peace of Westphalia and of Nimeguen, hath nevertheless been able most wisely to discover, that this is what the French Ministers do least of all aime at, and hath been so happy as to find out the most effectual and surest means to discover at once the truth and remedy thereos.

The Second Point.

The Zeal and sincere Affection his Majesty of Swedland hath for the publick Interest and Security, doth not shine forth with a less lustre on this occasion. For although by the Peace of Nimeguen his Majesty hath been obliged, as I have faid before, to lose two great tracts of Land belonging to his Provinces in the Empire, which it did import him very much to keep and preferve: and that on the other hand France hath offered great advantages, in case his Majesty would continue in the Alliance with that Crown; yet this Monarch hath not onely renounced his particular Interest and Concerns, which he in a most generous manner hath sacrificed to the Publick, but hath, by the figning of the abovesaid Alliance, acquired the glory, to have given to all the Princes of Europe, a very remarkable and important example of what they ought to doe, if they are really for the publick Good.

The

The third Point.

The continual Undertakings and Profecutions of France, ever fince the last Treaties of Peace of Nime-guen, the buying or conquests of Casal and Strasburg not excepted, and the effectual siege of Luxemburg, under the name of a blockade, have without question sufficiently discovered to all, that have any insight into the Assairs of Europe, what the Publick ought to expect from these dangerous Designs and Contrivances.

But as the Emissaries of his most Christian Majesty, that are dispersed up and down in all the principal Courts of Europe, endeavoured marvellously to colour all these formal Infractions of the Peace, affirming under high Protestations, that the King their Master defign'd nothing but a religious observation of the Peaces of Westphalia and Nimeguen; so there were Princes and Councils in the World, so good natured and so credulous, as to hearken and to give credit thereunto. his Majesty of Swedland, having signed the Alliance in question, and France having authentically given to understand, that it is to declare a war against that Crown, and that the French King cannot look upon those as his friends, that are always ready to fign such Alliances, since it must not be doubted, that they are directly contrary to his most essential Interest: there is not, I think (I dare not fay) any Prince or Politick Council, but any Inhabitant of a despicable country Town in Europe, that doth not plainly see, what the Publick must expect from the fincere Intentions on that side. And it is in that fense, I have said that, I know nothing more effectual to open the Eyes of all Princes and Sovereign States in Christendom. And to look into the bottom of this truth, we need but take notice, and lay down positively tor

for matter of fact, that fince the World was govern'd by Kings, Princes and Sovereign States, all humane Wisedom and Knowledge could never find out any other means or expedient, to settle the publick Peace and Tranquility, when a War was broke forth, but

the doing of these things.

The first, by friendly endeavours or mediation to make the Parties engag'd agree upon a congress or assembly of their Ambassadours at a certain Place. The second, to bring 'em to an agreement, and to make 'em sign Treaties for the appeasing of their Quarrels. The third, to make Alliances for the maintaining, garanty, and observing of these Treaties of Peace, to the end,

the stronger may not oppress the weaker.

And it is not to be found, that ever any Prince did oppose these sorts of endeavours, that are of publick right, except those Princes which from time to time have projected the subduing at any rate indifferently of all States, Princes and Nations. And not to flatter our selves, we ought to know, that we are come to that pass, that no man that is not out of his wits, can any longer doubt it; since the onely Party, from whence we ought to sear all, hath declared it in so plain and authentick a manner, that no reasonable man can be ignorant of it any longer.

And this declaration is made, according to my apprehension, in two manner of ways, which I am go-

ing to explain one after another.

The first Manner.

The two thirds of Europe being engag'd in a War, an agreement is made for a general Peace, which was divided into several particular Treaties, aiming at the same end. France signs them as well as the rest. Upon the faith

of these Treaties every one disarms; France onely reinforces his Troops: and whilst every one thinks himself secure, France erects two Tribunals of his own Subjects, one at Metz, the other at Brifack, and by these two, caufeth to be adjudged to the Crown, by Sentences supposed by France irrevocable, all that is any ways commodious and profitable to the same; and his Armies execute by main force all the decrees of these two Tribunals; and so much to the purpose, that during the two years of Peace, France hath made more conquests, than in seven continual years of War: a most admirable manner France hath been able to make use of, for to subdue all Europe without bloudshed. Whence it is to be judged, that Cyrus, Alexander and Cæsar, were but beginners in the art of Conquering; fince by this new method, it is easy to conquer by pieces one strong Place after another, and whole States and Republicks, without hazard or loss, and without any inconveniency of Moment.

The Second Manner.

The Empire and Spain well meaning, keeping close to their old Maxims, Maxims of Faith and Honour, and not being able to make use of these new methods of Conquering, hitherto unheard of and unknown, being furprized, to fee themselves brought in a condition to be in a short time intirely subdued, speak aloud, and call for their mutual fuccour, with a most lamentable voice. Their Neighbours hear their cries, and are not ignorant of the justice and necessity thereof. This particular Allarum dilates and expands it felf, and becomes general. Men of understanding and judgment examine the subject matter thereof, and perceive what is the business, to wit, that France laughs at, and makes sport with the Faith of all Treaties, that can be made with that Crown, and consequently doth regard all Christendom, with all the

the Princes and Potentates thereof, as <u>Callis</u>, and fit to be made a facrifice of to its ambition, so haughtily resolved upon and almost in the same manner practised by that Crown several years since, on a great part of the Provinces of the House of <u>Burgundy</u>, belonging to <u>Spain</u>, on all those of the House of <u>Lorrain</u>, of <u>Monbeliard</u>, of the Dukedom of <u>Deux Ponts</u>, of the whole <u>Alsatia</u>, and

lately of Strasburg and Cafal.

A reflexion of this nature is able to produce in the mind of thinking Men, a defire to find out the most effectual expedients, to stop the practice of such Undertakings; and to bring France back, if it be possible, by amicable ways, into the road of Equity and Justice. To compass which, there are no better means to be found out, when all is done, than the lawfull and rightfull ways, permitted on fuch Occasions, as we have set them down. In consequence whereof, the greatest part of the Princes of Europe, have been stirring and endeavouring to make Alliances, and his Majesty of Swedland hath of his own accord, made one with the States General. France no fooner had notice thereof, but publisheth, that this is to declare war against that Crown, which cannot look upon those as its friends, that are always ready to fign such Alliances, as not being to be doubted, that they are directly contrary to its most essential Interest. And for my part, I believe that in faying this, the French do speak true, delivering at least for this but their true Sentiments.

It's an hypochondriack by nature, that by policy or art strives to look smooth and phlegmatick, but being pinch'd or struck on a suddain, declares by his transports, the very thoughts of his heart, and the natural inclina-

tions of his Mind.

In a word, France hath in all manner of ways declared it self, and very authentically too. It now behoveth all Princes of Europe, to doe the same at their turn; for

it belongeth to every one of them, to know whether they are resolved voluntarily to undergo the Yoke of France, or to desend themselves generously; there be-

ing but one of these two courses to be taken.

If they chuse the first, there remaineth nothing, but without any compliments to play bankrupt to the publick interest, to their own glory, and to their most essential private concerns, under the idle title of neutrali-

ty or fome other.

If the other, nothing else is necessary, but a generous imbracing the publick interest, and to be admitted and comprehended in the Alliances, made on that subject, every one according to his condition and forces; so that out of all these Alliances there be made but one, as a concert; conform whereunto it is necessary to act, in order to a Peace or War.

These endeavours are the more of an absolute necesfity, because to the end no body may flatter himself, it ought maturely to be considered, that by the late buying or conquering of Strasburg and Cafal, France hath at last got the way and infallible means, to conquer piece by piece, what part of Europe it pleaseth, whereby the ruine of all must necessarily follow; and can be prevented no other way, than by a league and confederacy of all the Princes and States of Europe, or at least of the greatest and most considerable part thereof. And for this reason, I leave it to the judgment of every understanding person, of how great importance it is, to lose no time, to perfect a work so necessary for the conservation, or rather restoration of the publick peace and tranquility, in regard of the vast Forces of France, and the late discovery of the Designs of that Crown.

But France seeing all its Designs laid open, and having reason to apprehend, that every one may act according to his true Interest, to break its measures; that Crown

makes

makes use of all, and omits nothing, to compass two things, either to soment Divisions and Jealousies amongst several Princes, or by the means of Money, to ingage some of them into its Interest, by several specious Promises.

But let every Prince, that may liften thereunto, be with all due respect minded, that in so doing, he appears as wife, as the Overfeers of the great Dike of West Friefland would be, if after they had been informed, that their capital Dike had began to shake, and to open it self in several places, did think it better, to be obstinate, in cleanfing some petty despicable Ditch, in the heart of their Province, than to go and imploy their care and industry, in repairing and strengthening with all speed the openings and breaches of the great Dike, which by an effect of their stupid neglect and carelesness, may come to drown, at the first high water, their whole Province. This is what I thought fit to fay, to let the World know two things; the first, the wisedom and generosity of that spirit of Direction, that hath in effect produced the Alliance of his Majesty of Swedland, and of the Republick of the united Provinces; the second, of how great importance it is for the establishing of the publick Peace and Security, that this generous and great Example be followed by all the Princes in Christendom. But if there be a Council so corrupted or so weak, as to hinder its Prince to fignalize himself in such an occasion, let the same be pleased, that with all the respect due to its Sovereign, I do fend the Members thereof to School to Algiers, that to their eternal shame, it may be said, that of a small and inconsiderable Republick, composed for the greatest part of Corsaires and Renegadoes, they stood in need to learn the Rules of Vertue, Policy and Generosity. And here without going any further, I do conclude for this time.

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